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Articles

Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director

Liability
Jaclyn A. Chery*
I. INTRODUCTION
The nonprofit world is in a state of transition. The glut of
organizations establishing themselves as nonprofit charitable
entities has forced funders and the communities being served to
reassess how these groups benefit society and just what privileges
they should be afforded.' Board of Director scandals, both
nationally and locally, have littered newspapers over the past
decade, threatening "to undermine the trust and goodwill necessary
for the nonprofit sector to function successfully."2 Yet, there
remains a strong belief that the function these organizations
perform is valid and extremely important to the business and moral
fabric of the nation. In the United States, three traditions and
concepts, the Judeo-Christian "tzedaka," the Greek notion of
philanthropy, and the notion of fiduciary responsibility, or
"trustworthiness," are strongly ingrained in the legal treatment
3
afforded charitable organizations.
A number of external variables are causing nonprofit
* Professor and Associate Director Clinical Legal Education at Duquesne University
School of Law.
1. This article evaluates the role of directors serving IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations,
although much of the discussion also pertains to the other 501(c) categories.
2. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:
Paradoxes,Problems, and ProposedReforms, 23 J. CoRP. L 631 (1988).
3. Laura B. Chisholm and Dennis R. Young, What is Charity? Implications for Law
and Policy: Introduction, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 653, 658 (1988).
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organizations to defend and redefine their role and purpose. These
variables include competition from secular organizations operating
as for-profits; mandates from funding agencies to merge,
consolidate, or form consortiums to compete for limited resources;
changing community expectations; and the ever-increasing demand
on board members to be knowledgeable and accountable for their
actions are but a few such variables.
This article examines the role and responsibilities of nonprofit
directors in the nonprofit arena. It first reviews the current state of
the law and standard of accountability among board members
while acknowledging the need for more serious oversight by the
agencies empowered to monitor these organizations. Although this
article emphasizes the need for director accountability, it also
examines the protections from liability that are afforded board
members and considers whether these safeguards are sufficient to
attract able persons. 4 If directors, who are typically busy
individuals acting in a volunteer capacity, are discouraged from
serving on nonprofit boards because of a fear of growing exposure
to liability, the nonprofit world will suffer and the community at
large will encounter huge gaps in services once provided by
organizations gone extinct because of a lack of commitment to
serve on their boards. 5

H.

ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF NONPROFIT DIRECTORS

The historical role and responsibilities of nonprofit directors has
evolved in response to changes in the nature of modem nonprofit
organizations. "A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an
organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any,
to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members,
officers, directors, or trustees."6 Institutions organized for
charitable purposes can be traced back as far as the 1601 English
Statute of Charitable Uses, although it is almost certain charitable
4. Elizabeth Moody, State Statutes Governing Directors of Charitable Corporations,18
U.S.F. L REv. 749, (1984); see also Boyd, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under
State Not-for-Profit CorporationsStatutes, 72 IowA L REv. 725-26 (1987).
5. Gordon H. Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit Organizations: An Appropriate
Standard of Conduct for Trustees and Directors of Museums and Other Cultural
Institutions, 85 DIcK L REv. 607, 611-12 (1981).
6. Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE LJ. 837, 840 (1980).
Note that this is the most widely accepted definition. See, for example, Fishman, The
Developments of Nonprofit CorporationLaw and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L J.
617-18 (1985).
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organizations existed for centuries before.7 The Statute of
Charitable Uses had two main objectives: the first was to reform
the administration of trusts that were established for charitable
purposes throughout the England countryside,8 the second, and that
of primary historical significance, enumerated those purposes that
were considered charitable and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of
the commissions.9
The favorable treatment afforded to charitable organizations in
England was brought to the New World by the first settlers. 0 In
early Colonial American society, influential Protestant churches
looked with favor on philanthropic activities, and charities
persisted in the New World due largely to the churches." The
various denominations "all shared the traditional Protestant
emphasis upon the individual's responsibility for the spiritual
material welfare of the community, and accordingly supported a
variety of charitable institutions." 12 The immediate need that
inspired this benevolent behavior was the necessity for hospitals,
13
churches, and schools.
The nonprofit corporation became the most prominent
14
organizational form for charitable activities in the United States.
The popularity of this corporate form has been attributed to "the
special circumstances of the New World, the vagaries of historical
7. 43 Eliz. Ch. 4 (1601), officially titled "An Act to Redress Misemployment of Lands,
Goods and Stocks of Money Heretofore Given to Charitable Uses."
8. JAMES J. FISHMAN, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 28-29 (1995), citing GARETH JONES, HISTORY
OF THE LAW. OF CHARrrY 1532-1827 26-27 (1969).
9. Id. The purposes set forth by the Statute are as follows: "relief for the aged,
impotent and poor people, for maintenance of the sick and maimed soldiers and mariners,
schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities, for repair of bridges, ports,
havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways, for education and preferment of
orphans, for or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, for marriages
of poor maids, for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and
persons decayed, for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any
poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes."
Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses.
10. FISHMAN, supra note 8, at 29, citing HOWARD S. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 1776-1844 (1961). But see, ROBERT H. BREMENER, AMERICAN
PHILANTHROPY 5-18 (2ed. 1988), who suggests that the first philanthropists in the New world
were not the first settlers, rather they were the Indians first encountered by Christopher
Columbus, who, according to Columbus' reports were "ingenious and free" with all they had,
gave anything away that was asked of them, and bestowed each gift "with as much love as if
their hearts went with it."
11. FISHMAN, supra note 8, at 621-22.
12. FISHMAN, supra note 8, citing Miller, supra note 12, at 4-8.
13. Id.
14. FISHMAN, supra note 8, at 619.
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scholarship, the rapid growth of the charitable sector and
increasing similarities in size, structure, and management between
5
charitable organizations and business corporations."'
From these early beginnings and definitions of charities within
the communities they serve in today's sophisticated charitable
nonprofit world, the role and responsibilities of board members
have evolved. Today's board members face a myriad of issues that
simply were not present during the early development of nonprofit
law. Although courts have historically looked to trust law as the
basis for defining director liability, most recently, the courts have
begun to look to nonprofit .corporate law.
Nonprofit directors act for the benefit of others and, therefore,
have fiduciary duties that are defined by state corporate statutes
and federal income tax law.16 State nonprofit corporate statutes 7
generally define a board of director's duties as the duty of care,
duty of loyalty, and duty of obedience. Internal Revenue Code §
501(c) specifically outlines directors' responsibilities in maintaining
8
an organization as an exempt charitable organization.
The duty of care requires directors to discharge their duties
"with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances." 19 In discharging these duties,
nonprofit corporate directors may rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements of other board members, employees of the
corporation, legal counsel, and committees of the board, as long as
directors believe the source to be reliable and competent.20 A
director may not rely blindly on others. However, "a director need
not exhaustively research every issue personally to comply with the
legal requisites."2 ' The obligation of directors to exercise due care
15. Id.
16. Nonprofit directors are also often constrained by state tax law, which includes
requirements for tax exemption similar to Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3). Most state
codes have provisions for exempting nonprofit corporations from income, sales and property
tax. See, e.g. 72 P.S. § 5020-204; 10 P.S. § 371-75 (Supp. 1998).
17. Those states that do not have a separate nonprofit code section either follow the
for profit law closely or the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. See FISHMAN, supra
note 14.
18. See IRC § 501(c).
19. REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT§ 8.30(a)(2) (1987). See also PA STAT. ANN. Trr. 15 §
7734 (WEST 1986). (Supp. 1986). "OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS SHALL BE DEEMED TO STAND IN A
FIDUCIARY RELATION TO THE CORPORATION, AND SHALL DISCHARGE THE DUTIES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
POSITIONS IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH THAT DILIGENCE, CARE AND SKILL WHICH ORDINARILY PRUDENT MEN
WOULD EXERCISE UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES."

20.
21.

See id. § 8.30 (b)(1)-(4).
DANIEL L KuRrz, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 29 (1988).
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does not mean that the directors will incur liability for honest
mistakes of judgment. The "business judgment" rule provides that
decisions by boards about "business" matters are presumed to be
correct. The rule provides complete protection from liability for
business judgments as long as the judgment is rational and involves
no conflicting interest and the director acts in a manner that he or
22
she believes is reasonably informed.
"The duty of loyalty requires directors to exercise their powers in
the interest of the corporation not in their own interest or in the
interest of another entity or person."23 To satisfy the duty of loyalty,
a nonprofit director must act in "good faith" and "in a manner the
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation."24 The duty of loyalty requires a director to be
sensitive to potential conflict, to disclose the conflict before the
board takes any action, and, upon disclosure, to have a
25
disinterested board review the matter.
Directors are required to maintain confidentiality with respect to
all matters involving the nonprofit corporation "until there has been
a general public disclosure or unless the information is a matter of
public record or common knowledge." 26 Conflicts of interest and
corporate opportunity matters also fall within the duty of loyalty.
Directors must reveal to their fellow directors any conflicts of
interest or potential conflicts of interest and are obligated to refer
to the corporation business opportunities appropriate for the
27
organization before they may use them for their personal benefit.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a tax-exempt
organization must be organized and operated so that "no part of
[its] net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual.2 This prohibition against inurement means that a private
individual should not receive organization funds except as
reasonable compensation for goods or services. 29 In addition, the
organization cannot pay excessive compensation, pay for services
22. Hugh K. Webster, "Fiduciary Duties of Non-Profit Directors: Old and New
Perspectives," Spcl. Rpt., Non-Profit Legal & Tax Newsletter (Organization Management, Inc.,
Mechanicsville, VA), 3-4.
23. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIREcToRs OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 28 (George W. Overton ed.,
1993).
24. REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.30.(a) (1), (3).
25. Id. § 8131 (a)-(c).
26. Overton, supra note 23, at 32.
27. Id.
28. IRC § 501 (c)(3).
29. Id.
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that are not provided, or provide free or below-market-price goods
or services to private persons, other than members of the
charitable class the organization serves.30 Proscribed private
inurement
involves
transactions
involving
unreasonable
compensation, unreasonable rental charges, and unreasonable
3
borrowing arrangements. '
The duty of obedience requires nonprofit boards to follow the
organization's founding documents (i.e., corporate articles and
bylaws) when taking any action and when spending funds donated
to the corporation.3 2 A principal rationale for the duty of obedience
is the reliance of donors on an organization's faithfulness to its
purpose a The duty places limits on how an organization may
modify its activities without invoking some representative of the
public interest to step forward and defend the organization's
mission.3 4
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

The board of directors of a nonprofit corporation is, as a body,
responsible for the oversight of the corporation. Although
individual directors have little authority in their personal capacities,
they are legally accountable and have certain rights and obligations
that flow from their office.5 Most corporations organized for the
public benefit do not have members; therefore, the board of
directors is typically the sole policy making authority and is
self-perpetuating. 3 Nonprofit directors and trustees are selected for
reasons such as the following: they represent constituency groups;
they have special skills or have access to sources of funding; they
bring recognition through their prominence; or they represent the
community or sources of support.3 7 Board members are elected to
be responsive to those who elected or appointed them and to
30.

Id.

31.
Id.
32. Alco Gravure, Inc. v. The Knapp Foundation, 479 N.E.2d 752, (1985); Holt v.
College of Osteopathic Physicians, 394 P2d 932 (1964); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Barnes Foundation, 159 A.2d 500, 505 (1960).
33. Daniel L Kurtz, Safeguarding the Mission: The Duties and Liabilities of Officers and
Directors of Nonprofit Organizations, (726 AU-ABA 15, 1992, citing Trustees of Rutgers
College v. Richman, et al., 125 A.2d 10, 26 (1956).
34.

35.
36.
37.

Id.

Id.
Attorney General v. Hahnemany Hospital, 494 N.E.2d 1011 (1986).
REv. MODFL NoNPRoFrr CORP. AcT §8.01 (1987).
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remain loyal and promote the organization itself.3
A basic function of the board is to select the organization's
executives and oversee their performance. 39 The model an
organization adopts depends on the size and scope of the
nonprofit's activities, its needs, its characteristics, and the board
environment. Nonprofit boards translate this mandate in different
ways. "Most of the problems that befall groups stem from the fact
that boards have over the years, translated their [mandate] with as
much variety as husbands and wives interpret their vows to love,
honor and obey."40
Board decision-making processes are as varied as these in the
organizations that make up the nonprofit sector. In reality,
decisions are often made on the basis of incomplete information,
under rushed circumstances, or on the basis of gut feelings rather
than by following the formalized method of decisions set forth in
the law.41 Some commentators believe that a board's most
important decisions regard the content of its agenda; that is, "the
decisions as to what it will tend to and how it will allocate the
limited resources and time available." 42 Usually the management
rather than the board sets the agenda for board consideration;
therefore, the board is often more reactive that initiatory.4 The
larger the nonprofit organization, the more complex and diverse its
activities will be and the less likely the board will become involved
in a particular decision. 44 Regardless of the size of a board, or the
scope of its involvement, its responsibilities and liabilities remain
the same.
A. The Internal Revenue Code
Board members are required to be faithful to the mandates of
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and can be found
liable if the requirements of this code section are breached by an
38.

Id.

39. ABA STANDARD
CORPORATIONS 7-8 (1993).

OF

AMERICAN

LAw

GUIDEBOOK

FOR

DIRECTORS

OF

NONPROFIT

40. QUOTED IN MELISSA MIDDLETON, NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS BEYOND THE
GOVERNANCE FUNCTION, IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR- A RESEARCH HANDBOOK(Walter W. Powell ed.,

1987).
41. Id.
42. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgement Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW 1477, 1484 (1984).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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organization under their direction.45 To qualify for exempt status
under Section 501(c)(3), an organization must be organized as a
nonprofit corporation or as a "community chest, fund, or
foundation."4 An exempt organization must be organized and
operated exclusively for religions, charitable, scientific, educational,
or other code-designated purposes.47 No part of its "net earnings"8
may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Moreover, "substantial part" of the organization's activities may
consist of certain lobbying activities, and the organization may not
participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office. 49 Board members are
required to be vigilant so that the organization, in carrying out its
mission, continues to meet these requirements.
In addition, Section 503 denies tax exemption to organizations
that engage in specified "prohibited transactions."5° These
transactions include the following: lending money without adequate
security; paying excessive compensation; and providing services on
a preferential basis to the creator of, or contributor to, the
organization.5 '
If a tax-exempt organization violates the prohibition on private
inurement through self-dealing or any other of the requirements set
forth above, the penalty is loss of its tax-exempt status. 52 Some
believe this penalizes the organization's patrons and donors more
so than the self-dealers.5 In some cases, self-dealing may also raise
questions as to whether the organization is being operated
exclusively for Section 501(c)(3) purposes.54
In an effort to deal more directly with wrongdoers and in
response to the extreme penalty of revocation of tax-exempt status,
the Internal Revenue Service initiated "intermediate sanctions" as a
remedy for situations in which "disqualified persons" engage in an
45.
46.

IRC §501(c)(3); see also Treas. Regs. §§1.501(c)(3)-I(a), (b), (c) (1954).
Id.

47.

Id.

48.
49.
1992).
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id., see also BRUCE R. HopINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMP'

ORGANZATIONS (6th Ed.

See IRS §503(b) (1988).
See Id.
See generally 1 MARLYN G. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: LAW AND TAXATION
§11k02 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (analyzing forms of impermissible private inurement).
53. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L S. 835, 874
(1980). Hansmann, supra note 6, at 874
54.

Id.
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"excess benefit transaction" with a Section 501(c)(3) organization.w
These sanctions impose an initial excise tax of twenty-five percent
on the amount of any "excess benefit" provided to an "insider", by
a public charity.5 An additional excise tax of two hundred percent
of the excess benefit is imposed when the transgression is not
corrected within a certain period of time. Moreover, an additional
excise tax of ten percent of the excess benefit may be imposed on
any officer, director, trustee, or manager of an organization who
agrees to the transaction, knowing it is an excess benefit.57 The
determination of whether compensation is reasonable and whether
the decision to give it was adequately considered is determined on
the basis of all of the facts and circumstances.5 "Disqualified
persons" are those who have substantial influence over the exempt
organization. Such persons include officers and directors of the
public charity and persons who have held positions of authority
with the charity during the five years preceding the transaction. 59 In
an "excess benefit" transaction, the value of the economic benefit
conferred exceeds the value of the consideration received. 60
Potential excess benefit transactions include compensation
decisions affecting officers, directors, and key employees and
transactions involving the sale of property between a public charity
61
and one of its managers or employees.
B. Case Law
The courts have been reluctant to uphold Internal Revenue
Service decisions to revoke an organization's Section 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status or to impose this penalty themselves. 62 Rather,
courts have imposed other remedies or penalties, particularly
against nonprofit boards of directors when they have breached
55. IRS § 4958, which became effective for transactions occurring after September 14,
1995.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. IRC § 4958.
61. Id.
62. Some exceptions include, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States,
412 E2d 1197, 1202 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970) (Court denied tax
exemption to a church that made unexplained payments in the form of salaries and rentals,
to its founder); John Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 1981-82 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9745
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (Court denied tax-exempt status to a law school due to violations of the
non-inurement provision); Horace Heidt Found. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 634, 638 (Ct.
Cl. 1959) (Court denied tax exemption where an entertainer personally benefited from a
foundation founded by him).
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their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
In 1997, the New York State Board of Regents removed eighteen
of the nineteen trustees of Adelphi University for dereliction of
duty in overseeing the university and its president's actions,a When
Peter Diamandopoulous became president of the university in 1985,
it had 7,000 students, an endowment of four million dollars, a
decaying capital plant, and a declining student body. Although
Diamandopoulos increased the endowment to forty-eight million
dollars and renovated the campus, the student body declined to
4,300. The university's academic reputation also suffered.r
Diamandopoulos lost the support of all campus constituents except
the trustees, most of whom he had appointed. 85 In the fall of 1995,
a report in the Chronicle of Higher Education revealed that
Diamandopoulos was the nation's second highest paid college
president and a Committee to Save Adelphi was formed and
brought allegations to the New York Board of Regents. 66 The
committee accused the governing board and president of
misappropriation of funds, conflicts of interest, and lavish
expenditures by the president.67 The committee alleged the
following reasons for the removal of the trustees: excessive
compensation paid to the university's president; a failure to review
the president's job performance; refusal to abide by the university's
bylaws relating to faculty governance; board misconduct; and
impermissible conflicts of interest. 68 The board was not informed of
the president's compensation and expenses (which reached
$837,113 in 1995-1996 and included an option to purchase a
university-owned luxury apartment in Manhattan, a rent-free home
on campus, an $82,000 Mercedes-Benz automobile, and reimbursed
expenses such as cognac at $150 a glass).6 9 After the Regents'
decision, the matter was formally referred to New York's attorney
70
general to proceed with a civil action.
In another fairly recent public scandal, criminal charges were
brought against Aramony, the President of the United Way of
63. The Committee to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos, Board of Regents of the
University of the State of New York (1997).
64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. See Wflliam H. Honan, Campus in YTrmoil: A Special Report; Adelphi, a Little
University with Big Ideas, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 5, 1997.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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America, who resigned after allegations of self-dealing surfaced."
Critics charged that he spent corporate funds lavishly and pledged
corporate contracts to finms managed by friends and family
members. 72 The Board of Directors of the United Way of America
was questioned for its dereliction of duties and the organization
suffered some public relations setbacks, although no individual
board member received any personal punishment. 73
The board was composed of thirty-seven high-profile chief
executives of major corporations and met only twice a year. A
fourteen-person executive committee met twice annually. A week
or two before each meeting, board members received a one
inch-thick booklet containing financial statements, favorable news
clippings, upbeat committee reports and an agenda 74 This was the
context of the board's oversight.
In 1991, the President of the United States Olympic Committee, a
federally chartered nonprofit organization, stepped down after
reports indicated that he had received at least $127,000 in
consulting fees from clients pursuing Olympic contracts.7 5 There
again, the court did not punish the board of directors for not
carrying out its fiduciary duties.
IV.

BOARD OF DIRECTOR LIABILITY

A. Who Is Responsible for Oversight
The primary monitor of a nonprofit's performance and that of its
board of directors is the state in which the nonprofit incorporated,
but the degree of state scrutiny varies widely across state lines and
differs with the type of organization. Hospitals, health care
76
providers, and educational institutions are heavily regulated.
"Mutual benefit nonprofits and certain public charities are virtually
71. See Felicity Barringer, United Way Head is Forced Out in a Furor Over His
Lavish Style, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 28, 1998, at Al. In April, 1995, a federal judge found Aramony
guilty of steeling more than $600,000 from the United Way and using the funds to support
lavish personal expenses and international travel. See Tim Weiner, United Way's Ex-Chief
Indicted in Theft, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 14, 1994 at A12.
72. See Kathleen Teltsch, United Way Awaits Inquiry on its President'sPractices,N.Y.
TiuEs, Feb. 24, 1992 at A 12.
73. Id.
74. Felicity Barringer, Charity Boards Learn To Be Skeptical, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992
at §1, 10.
75. See Mark Asher & Christine Brennan, Helmick Quits as President of USOC, WASH.
Posr, Sept. 19, 1991, at B 1; Rachel Shuster & Mike Dodd, Helmick Dealings Raise
Questions, USA Today, Sept. 5, 1991, at I C.
76.

JAMES J. FisHmAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1995).
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self-regulated."77 The state attorney general is responsible for
overseeing nonprofit corporations and may initiate such actions as
are appropriate to protect the public interest. 78 Staffing problems
and a lack of interest in monitoring nonprofits, however, make
attorney general oversight more theoretical than actual. Most state
offices of the attorney general lack even one full time lawyer
charged with oversight of charitable organizations, and, because
directors are essentially volunteers, aggressive attempts to enforce
their responsibilities are viewed as inappropriate and likely to
discourage others from serving on boards. In recent years, most
attorneys general have focused on fundraising and solicitation
abuses rather than breach of fiduciary obligations. 79 The attorney
general, as the representative of the stockholders and public,
promotes accountability of charities and fiduciaries.80 Other than
the attorney's general, however, only individuals with special
interests, such as directors, have standing to initiate legal actions
against nonprofits and their boards.81
B. What Is Actionable
Board members may be liable in three situations. First, board
members may be liable for breach of their fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience, if as a result of such breach, the
organization has been injured. Those fiduciary responsibilities may
be enforced by the organization or by someone acting on its behalf,
such as other directors, officers, or the state attorney general. 82
Second, board members may be liable in a third-party lawsuit;
that is, if a person dealing with the organization suffers some
personal or financial injury. Generally, board members enjoy
immunity from liability to third persons arising from acts of agents
or employees of the organization. However, individual directors
may be liable if they participate in or authorize the action that
leads to the harm. Typically, third-party claims arise in the area of
tort liability as a result of injury to persons or property arising
from wrongful conduct.83
Although it is difficult and unlikely that a director will be found
77. Id. at 243.
78. Id.
79. KuRnz, supra note 21, at 93.
80. FIsHMAN, supra note 8.
81.

GEORGE S. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §411 (2d.

rev. ed. 1991).
82. Fishman, supra note 76.
83. Id.
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liable in a third-party action, defending such claims can be very
expensive. Responding to concern about potential exposure to
claims by volunteer nonprofit directors and escalating defense
costs, a number of states have passed statutes concerning the
liability of nonprofit directors.84 These tort reform measures are
designed to shield uncompensated directors from liability to third
persons for injuries to persons or property except in cases of gross
negligence. 85
Third, directors may be liable if they violate the requirements of
particular statutes. Directors enjoy no insulation from liability when
the corporation is engaged in illegal or fraudulent activities. 86 For
example, sanctions may be imposed for the submission of false or
inaccurate information filed in connection with regulatory and
reporting schemes. The most notable example concerns tax laws
under which directors may be held responsible for failure to collect
8
or pay state sales and real estate taxes.
At present, forty-two states impose some form of registration,
reporting, or bond requirements on charities that raise funds.
Boards can be held liable for failure to follow these filing
requirements. Substantial disputes are raging over how far a state
can go in regulating this form of interstate commerce and political
speech. 88
C. What Protectionfrom Liability Is Available
Nonprofits can protect their directors from liability in certain
situations through indemnification and insurance. State statutory
law governs the scope of indemnification; in general, to qualify for
indemnification, a director must have acted in good faith and in the
best interest of the corporation. Indemnification provisions may
89
also be included' in an organization's bylaws.
Even with extensive indemnification provisions, insurance
protection is usually necessary to provide broader coverage and
protection for board members. 90 Director and officer liability
insurance ("D&O insurance") can relieve an organization from the
burden of accumulating substantial funds to indemnify its board
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
(D. Utah
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Overton, supra note 23 at 32.
See e.g., Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985).
See American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Francine A. Giani, Civ. No. 2:97-CV-610B
Aug. 8, 1998).
KuRmT,supra note 21.
Id.
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members and can protect directors if the organization decides not
to indemnify even when indemnification is permitted.9 1
In an effort to offer consistent standards of protection in the
area of tort liability, Congress enacted the Volunteer Protection Act
in 1997.92 The act preempts state immunity laws, unless they
provide greater protection, and grants immunity as long as a
volunteer was involved in one of four delineated situations set
forth in the statute.9 3
In three recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has
limited the sanctions that state and local governments can imposes
on board members for failure to file charitable solicitation
documents or for otherwise breaching their duties.9 4 Nonetheless, a
great deal of uncertainty remains in this area. There is the potential
for penalties to be imposed on the charity and perhaps its
directors, regardless of any good intent behind the activity.
It is always within a board of director's best interest to put into
place risk management procedures. 95 The procedures usually
involve steps to be undertaken by the directors to reduce the
chance that the directors will cause injury to the organization or to
third parties. Such procedures can involve board oversight, policies,
and procedures in potential risk areas, prevention of unlawful
conduct, avoidance of self-dealing, and board education.9 6
V. How BOARD

MEMBERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE

Although the discharge of fiduciary responsibility rests with each
individual board member and, although each board member can be
held personally liable in the above-discussed areas, some types of
governance structures, the promotion of particular types of
behavior, and the fostering of certain habits of deliberation can
foster the careful performance of the board's responsibilities.
91.

REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.52.

92. See 42 U.S.C. § 14501 (1997).
93. Id. Delineating the four situations for protection as: (1) acting within the scope of
volunteer activity; (2) being properly licensed, if applicable; (3) harm did not occur because
of willful misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct or a conscious, outright
indifference to the right or safety of the injured party; (4) the harm did not occur while the
volunteer was operating a vehicle.
94. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988);
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
95. Ellen M. Burger, Esq., and Mary N. Wlke, Esq., Director Liability in Non-Profit
Corporations.What is it? How to avoid it, 34 N.H.B.J. 57, 63-65 (1993).
96. Id.
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Current director sanctions and punishments can also act as
deterrents. The question remains whether these standards are
sufficient to guarantee the future of charitable nonprofits and the
legal and ethical performance of duties by boards of directors.
State nonprofit corporation statutes do not sufficiently deter
directors from violating their fiduciary duties. The new federal
"intermediate sanctions" offer an incentive for boards of directors
to perform their duties lest they be fired and cause turmoil for the
organization or be fined for dereliction of duty.97 Both state and
federal approaches,
however, lack sufficient enforcement
mechanisms to discourage directors from breaching their fiduciary
98
duties.
The enforcement of duties under state nonprofit corporate law
depends mostly on private actions. In the for-profit corporate
arena, or the business sector, "entrepreneurial attorneys" enforce
fiduciary duties by seeking out profitable causes of action on
behalf of the shareholders. 99Attorney driven litigation is not as
effective in the nonprofit sector.1°° One reason is that in the
business sector, the public has relatively easy access to information
about corporations.10 1 In contrast, nonprofit corporations do not
issue publicly traded stock and are not subject to securities
reporting provisions. 0 2 This lack of information concerning
nonprofit corporations means that a plaintiff must conduct his or
her own investigation to bring suit. Moreover, because damages are
paid to the corporation and the plaintiffs attorney, plaintiffs may
have little incentive to bring a lawsuit. Thus, there are fewer
actions against nonprofit directors who breach their fiduciary
duties than there are against their for-profit counterparts.
It is also very difficult to deter improper nonprofit director
conduct regarding the duties and responsibilities outlined in the
97.
98.
(1992).
99.

IRC § 4958
Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HAR. L REV. 1590, 1599
See, e.g. John C.

Caffee, Jr.,

UNDERSTANDING

THE PLANTIFF'S

ATTORNEY:

THE

IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW THROUGH CLASS AND

DERIVATIVE ACTIONS, 86 COLUM. L REV. 669, 677-98 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, THE PLAINTtFS' ATTORNEY'S ROLE IN CLASS ACTION AND DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND RECCOMENDATIONS FOR REFORM, 58 U. CHI. L REV. 1, 3-7 (1991).

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Securities Act of 1933 specifically exempts charitable corporations satisfying
requirements similar to those in IRC § 501(c)(3) from initial public offering registration
requirements. These organizations are also exempt from the 1934 Act's registration
requirements. See U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(D) (1988).
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Internal Revenue Code. Despite the recent changes to the structure
of the Internal Revenue Service, the resources allocated to seeking
out violations are limited. 1°3 Many breaches of fiduciary duties go
unchallenged or unnoticed. Aside from the 'intermediate sanctions,"
which permit the Internal Revenue Service to fine directors in
limited circumstances, the only other remedy is the denial or
revocation of nonprofit status in the event of Section § 501 (c)(3)
violations. 104
VI. CONCLUSION

Nonprofit charitable organizations perform an important function
in society and are, therefore, granted specific benefits. Nonprofit
boards of directors can be held accountable in several ways, yet
receive protection against liability in certain instances. If we are to
hold board members to higher standards of conduct in keeping
with the present state of the law then more resources must be
made available by the states and federal government to monitor
these actions and ensure accountability. In addition, we must be
prepared for a decline in volunteerism, which would accompany
stricter accountability.
It is to early to determine whether "intermediate sanctions" will
be more regularly imposed by the Internal Revenue Service now
that a division has been created specifically to handle this area and
whether such sanctions will be an effective deterrent. The only way
to ensure accountability is for the Internal Revenue Service to
consistently follow through with its mandate. States could then
follow suit and allot more resources toward this end and more
diligently pursue wrongdoing by board members.
Such increased monitoring and imposition of sanctions, although
designed to primarily benefit the nonprofits and the public will also
benefit boards of directors. Board members could be assured that
consistent measures are being followed and implemented and
would feel more comfortable in the parameters of their role in
serving nonprofits and the communities they benefit.

103. Specifically, the IRS now has a section which deals exclusively with Nonprofit
Charitable Organizations.
104. See IRC § 4958 which allows for fines to be levied against board members who
knew of excessive payments to an executive director and to the executive director himself.

